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SYMPOSIUM
FEDERAL GUN CONTROL AND
THE BRADY ACT
INTRODUCTION
ALBERT J. ROSENTHAL*
Do not let the narrow title of this Symposium deceive you. The
Editors of the Journal have, wisely, encouraged the participants
to explore related matters that put the subject into perspective
and add greatly to the value of this enterprise.
Analysis of the merits and shortcomings of one federal gun con-
trol statute will not answer all questions about the possibilities of
federal gun control generally. The latter, in turn, will not dispose
of problems of gun control at the state and local level, nor does a
focus on gun control alone give adequate attention to the causes of
and possible remedies for the high level of violence in the United
States. Finally, even violence is closely linked, in a tangled web of
causes and effects, with so much else that is worrisome in our soci-
ety-substandard education; the weakening of the family; drugs;
* Distinguished Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; Dean Emeritus,
Faculty of Law, Columbia University School of Law; B.A., University of Pennsylvania;
LL.B., Harvard Law School.
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race prejudice; growing poverty and the erosion of hope; the hous-
ing shortage; and much more. Quite properly therefore, the con-
tributors to this Symposium have tried to give us insights into
much of the context so necessary to a fuller understanding of our
core inquiry-whether and how government should deal with
guns.1
Although legal analysis should be informed by ideas and knowl-
edge emanating from other disciplines, the principal focus for a
law journal is naturally the law. As constitutional arguments
have often been in the forefront of debates about gun control, it is
not surprising that they are emphasized in legal discussions of the
subject. But with respect to the feasibility of gun control legisla-
tion, the Constitution is not the problem.
A tempting argument for opponents of gun control is based on
the Second Amendment, which reads:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.
But the courts have repeatedly held that the right of the people to
bear arms must be interpreted in light of the stated purpose of the
Second Amendment, namely the preservation of state militias,
and that the Amendment therefore does not confer rights upon
individuals.2 "Militia" was the term for what we now call the "Na-
1 In particular, see Senator Bill Bradley's thoughts in Violence in America, 10 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 43 (1994), and analyses by Christine L. Bella &-David L. Lopez entitled
Quality of Life-At What Price?: Constitutional Challenges to Laws Adversely Impacting
the Homeless, 10 ST. JomN's J. LEGAL Com~MNT. 89 (1994), and an analysis by Lynn Mur-
tha & Suzanne Smith entitled "An Ounce ofPrevention... ".-Restriction Versus Proaction
in American Gun Violence Policies, 10 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 205 (1994).
2 For an interesting clash of views regarding this issue compare Kevin A. Fox & Nutan
Christine Shah's piece, Natural Born Killers: The Assault Weapons Ban of the Crime Bill-
Legitimate Exercise of Congressional Authority or Infringement of a Constitutional Guaran-
tee?, 10 ST. JoHmes J. LEGAL CoMNMNT. 123 (1994), with Kevin M. Cunningham's When Gun
Control Meets the Constitution, 10 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL ComMENT. 59 (1994).
The leading Supreme Court case on the subject is not entirely clear. The Court rejected a
Second Amendment challenge to an indictment for transporting in interstate commerce a
sawed-off shotgun that had not been registered and for which a required tax had not been
paid, stating: "In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of
[such a weapon] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or effi-
ciency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees
the right to keep and bear such an instrument." United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178
(1939). Although this decision does not clearly dispose of the question of a weapon kept for
purely personal purposes but potentially useful for a militia, it has been generally assumed
in more recent cases that the Second Amendment confers no rights on individuals. E.g.,
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980); United States v. Swinton, 521 F.2d
1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1956); Sarah Brady, Working for a
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tional Guard"-reserves organized and activated under state au-
thority, but also subject to call into the service of the federal gov-
ernment in cases of riots and invasion.3
During a period of over fifty years, at least six federal statutes
regulating guns have been enacted, with few constitutional chal-
lenges and no invalidations on Second Amendment grounds.
Since the Second Amendment has not been "incorporated,"
through the Fourteenth Amendment, to apply to the states,4 chal-
lenges to state laws regulating guns have usually been based on
somewhat similar provisions in state constitutions, and have also
been generally rejected.
Even if the Second Amendment were interpreted as conferring
upon individuals some right to bear arms, there is no reason to
suppose that it would be held to be an absolute barrier to all limi-
tations.5 Even freedom of speech and of the press are not com-
pletely insulated by the First Amendment from government regu-
lation; consider for example, obscenity, fraud, copyright
infringement, and, especially relevant here, the right to publish
troop movements in time of war or to shout "fire" in a crowded
theater.6 A fortiori, the uncertain commands of the Second
Amendment could scarcely protect gun possession where the rela-
tionship of guns to potential loss of life is so much more direct.
Assuming, therefore, that the Second Amendment interposes no
barrier, federal statutes must still fall within an enumerated
power of Congress. It might be tempting to cite the Preamble to
the Constitution; one of the six purposes stated as reasons for es-
Safer America, 10 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL ComMENT. 77, 83 n.42 (1994). Perhaps reflecting the
fact that militias are less important today, and that such that exist usually keep their
weapons in an armory or other organizational storage space rather than have them taken
home by individual members, Second Amendment defenses have seldom been asserted in
recent years.
For a more complete analysis, see Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amend-
ment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 passim (1989).
3 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (stating power of Congress to call forth militia); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (stating that President is Commander in Chief of militia when it is
called into actual service of United States).
4 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (holding that Second Amendment "has
no... effect" other "than to restrict the powers of the National government"). This case was
decided before the Supreme Court began extending to the states any of the restrictions on
the federal government contained in the Bill of Rights. Even more recently, however, there
has been no indication that the Second Amendment might be applied to the states. See Fox
& Shah, supra note 2, at 132-33 and cases cited therein.
5 See Fox & Shah, supra note 2, at 128-30 (developing this analysis).
6 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919).
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tablishing the Constitution was "to insure domestic Tranquility,"
and guns are certainly a threat to tranquility. But the Preamble
has long been held not to be a source of additional powers in the
Federal Government,7 although it may be relevant in the interpre-
tation of powers conferred elsewhere in the Constitution.
The specific power of Congress most frequently invoked is the
power to regulate interstate commerce. The relationships among
guns, organized crime, the level of violence, and interstate com-
merce, are sufficiently demonstrable to sustain regulation of the
purchase, sale, transportation, possession, or use of guns.
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that it
will uphold a federal statute on the basis of the commerce power
only if there is a showing of substantial effect upon interstate or
foreign commerce,8 the Court has not found a lack of such effect in
any case since 1936. Both Congress and the executive branch
agencies have been casual in recent years about explaining such
links in statutes or regulations or even drafting recitals asserting
them, and the Court may eventually decide to insist on such evi-
dence, at least in borderline situations.
There is a case now pending before the Supreme Court that in-
volves gun control, and that might provoke such a response. The
Gun Free School Zones Act,9 forbidding the bringing of weapons
into or near schools, was invalidated by lower courts in United
States v. Lopez, 10 where in the absence of any showing by Con-
gress the courts refused to conclude that there was a sufficient
link to interstate commerce or a factual basis for invoking any
other federal power.-'
Whether or not Lopez will be the case in which the Supreme
Court may tighten the requirements, it should be simple for Con-
gress to insert appropriate recitals in all gun control statutes
where the connections to commerce are not obvious, and to de-
velop persuasive legislative history, factual data, etc., to provide
the necessary predicate to establish the relationship.
7 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).
8 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 280
(1981); see also id. at 307-13 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) and cases cited therein.
9 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1XA) (Supp. V 1993).
10 2 F.3d 1342, 1360-68 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 128 L. Ed. 2d 189 (1994).
11 See Ronald A. Giller, Note, Federal Gun Control in the United States: Revival of the
Tenth Amendment, 10 ST. JomN's J. LEGAL Co M w. 151, 155-57 (1994) (discussing these
and similar cases).
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There is also a long history of the use of the federal taxing
power as an alternative basis for regulation. From Alexander
Hamilton's protective tariff, designed to protect the new nation's
"infant industries" from competition of foreign imports, down to
the present time, the taxing power has repeatedly been used for
regulatory as well as revenue purposes, and even those taxes in-
tended primarily for the purpose of forcing products or practices
out of the market have been generally upheld. Moreover, Con-
gress has in the past used the taxing power to attempt to regulate
the possession and transfer of guns, modeling legislation on laws
that employed the taxing power to control narcotics. 12 The fact
that neither drugs nor guns have been extirpated does not neces-
sarily demonstrate the inappropriateness of the taxing power but
merely the inherent difficulty of enforcing laws intended to get rid
of either.
If gun control legislation is sustainable by the commerce power,
or the taxing power, may it nevertheless be invalidated by the
Tenth Amendment? Several lower federal courts have stricken a
temporary provision of the Brady law, i3 requiring the chief law
enforcement officer in each locality to conduct searches of police
records across the nation in order to determine whether intended
purchasers of handguns have been convicted of felonies, or have a
history of mental illness or other disqualifying qualities. This re-
quirement is to remain in effect only until such time as a comput-
erized national records system has been established and is acces-
sible. These lower courts have held this provision to be an
unconstitutional invasion of the autonomy of state governments,
because of the burdensome duties imposed by the federal govern-
ment upon state or local officials.' 4 For authority, these courts re-
lied on New York v. United States,15 in which portions of a federal
statute that imposed upon state officials duties and responsibili-
12 Compare Cunningham, supra note 2, at 67 with Wayne H. Wink, Jr., Note, Biting the
Bullet: Two Proposals to Stem the Tide of Gun Violence, 10 ST. JOwN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
235, 244-45 (1994).
13 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (Supp. V 1993).
14 See Cunningham, supra note 6, at 75-76; Richard E. Gardiner & Stephen P. Halbrook,
NRA and Law Enforcement Opposition to the Brady Act: From Congress to the District
Courts, 10 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 13, 24 (1994); Giller, supra note 11, at 172-74;
Timothy Jones & Janine Tyne, Printz v. United States: An Assault Upon the Brady Act or a
Tenth Amendment Fortification?, 10 ST. JomN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 179, 182 (1994); Mur-
tha & Smith, supra note 1, at 216 n.77; and cases cited therein.
15 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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ties pertaining to the storage of low-level nuclear waste were in-
validated by the Supreme Court as intruding on the autonomy of
the state in violation of the Tenth Amendment.16
Whether or not these lower court decisions will stand, they re-
late only to an interim provision of one statute and constitute no
threat to the constitutionality of gun control legislation gener-
ally. 17 Although the opinions legitimately invoke what is, under
current Supreme Court doctrine, a plausible application of the
Tenth Amendment, there is some confusion as to the relevance of
the Tenth Amendment to other aspects of gun control that are
quite different.18 Some of the confusion springs from careless
statements in opinions of the Supreme Court itself.
The trouble started with Hammer v. Dagenhart,19 in which the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal statute forbidding
the transportation in interstate commerce of the products of the
labor of children working for private employers. The majority
opinion asserted that the statute was doubly invalid, because it
imposed a regulation not warranted by the commerce power and
also because it violated the Tenth Amendment.2 0 It seemed to
many observers that analytically this case presented only one
question, not two. If the statute was authorized by the commerce
power, it was not a "power not delegated," and the Tenth Amend-
ment was inapplicable. In United States v. Darby,21 which over-
ruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, in upholding the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act's prohibition of the shipment in interstate commerce of
the products of underpaid labor, a unanimous Court characterized
the Tenth Amendment as stating "but a truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered."22
16 Id. at 2428-29. More specifically, the Court invalidated imposing upon the states a
choice of either accepting ownership of all waste generated within their borders and assum-
ing the liabilities that would spring from that, or regulating pursuant to Congress's direc-
tions. Id.
17 See Gardiner & Halbrook, supra note 14, at 14. Even the National Rifle Association is
not opposed in principle to the permanent provisions of the Brady law, establishing a
quickly accessible national repository of information relevant to the possible disqualifica-
tion of persons seeking permission to buy guns. Id. at 15.
18 See generally Giller, supra note 11, at 153-62; Jones & Tyne, supra note 14, at 181.
19 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
20 Id. at 276. "Thus the act in a twofold sense is repugnant to the Constitution. It not
only transcends the authority delegated to Congress over commerce but also exerts a power
as to a purely local matter to which the federal authority does not extend." Id.
21 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
22 Id. at 124.
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The next steps were a series of challenges to amendments to the
Fair Labor Standards Act that extended coverage of minimum
wage and maximum hour regulation to state and local govern-
ment employees. It was conceded that the wages and hours of
these employees were as closely related to interstate commerce as
were those of their counterparts in the private sector; these regu-
lations were attacked, however, on the ground that they were too
intrusive upon the right of the states to make their own decisions
concerning the work of their employees.
The Supreme Court has gone back and forth on this question,
and there may be more swings of the pendulum ahead. In Mary-
land v. Wirtz,2" the Court upheld the application of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to state government employees. In National
League of Cities v. Usery,24 Maryland v. Wirtz was specifically
overruled and that aspect of the statute held unconstitutional.
Confusion was revived, however, by the Court's express declara-
tion that its decision was based on the Tenth Amendment.25 An
intrusion on the state that falls within the enumerated powers
does not seem to be covered by the language or supported by the
history of the Tenth Amendment; it might have been clearer if the
Court had stated simply that the statute clashed with the mani-
fest intention of the Framers to preserve the states as effective,
autonomous, governmental entities. By calling it a Tenth Amend-
ment violation, the Court was giving that amendment a new ap-
plication, clearly in conflict with its characterization in United
States v. Darby.26
Nine years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,27 the Court expressly overruled National League of Cit-
ies in turn, holding that the intrusion did not sufficiently interfere
with the functioning of the states to be invalid. But the Court con-
tinued to call the issue one of the Tenth Amendment. 28 Since both
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, dissenting, warned that they
hoped to reassemble a majority of Justices to bring National
23 392 U.S. 183, 195-99 (1968).
24 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976).
25 See id. at 842-56.
26 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
27 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
26 Id at 536.
1994]
8 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
League of Cities back to life,29 still another swing of the pendulum
may be coming.
Wirtz, National League of Cities, and Garcia all involved a stat-
ute governing conduct affecting interstate commerce, regulating
both private and state governmental employment. New York v.
United States,30 however, was quite different. At issue in that
case was a directive to the state alone,31 ordering it to enact laws
or assune responsibilities, not on the basis of the judgment of the
state's own officials, but pursuant to an order from the federal gov-
ernment. The Court made clear that it was not reexamining Gar-
cia. 2 It referred again to the Tenth Amendment, but this time
tried to clarify the nature of the Court's reliance on it. 33
Thus, the only aspect of existing or proposed gun control legisla-
tion likely to give rise to serious Tenth Amendment problems is
the interim provision of the Brady law.34 Assuming that adverse
lower court decisions are affirmed, Congress again has a remedy
within reach. As pointed out in New York v. United States, the
Court has repeatedly upheld the practice of Congress to induce or
even coerce states to do its bidding by conditioning grants of funds
to the states upon their compliance. 35 For example, in South Da-
kota v. Dole, 3 6 Congress had conditioned states' eligibility for cer-
tain highway funds upon their enactment of laws prescribing
twenty-one as the minimum age for consumption of alcoholic bev-
erages. The Court assumed, arguendo, that Congress could not
29 See id. at 580. It is probably mere coincidence that the two Justices who wanted to
bring National League of Cities back from its ashes came from Phoenix.
30 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
31 Id. at 2420.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 2418-19. "In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no
difference whether one views the question at issue in this case as one of ascertaining the
limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions
of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under
the Tenth Amendment." Id. at 2419; see also Gardiner & Halbrook, supra note 14, at 31-33;
Giller, supra note 11, at 160-62; Jones & Tyne, supra note 14, at 187-92.
34 Application of federal gun control regulation to the public as well as the private sec-
tors, as in the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), is
unlikely.
35 112 S. Ct. at 2426-27; see also Giller, supra note 11, at 156; Jones & Tyne, supra note
14, at 199-201 n.144.
6 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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directly order the states to do this,3 7 but upheld the statute on the
basis of the power of Congress to condition its spending.38
Assuming, therefore, that the obstacles to effective gun control
laws are not constitutionally imposed, large areas of disagreement
as to policy nevertheless remain. In particular, what kinds of
guns should be controlled, what kinds of controls should be placed
upon them, by what agencies of government, and what may we
reasonably expect to be accomplished?39
If we are serious about intending, through gun control, to con-
tribute substantially to the reduction of violence, the mere prohi-
bition of sales to felons, the insane, and a few other suspect cate-
gories, is not likely to be sufficient. 40 Too many killings, especially
those committed by younger offenders, are done by those who have
had no previous conviction or other reason to be barred from buy-
ing guns. This might argue for an additional requirement of a
showing of compelling need for the buyer to qualify for a license,
obtainable only upon submission of proof of unusual circum-
stances in which possession of a gun may be vital. However, even
such a rule may not necessarily be effective, as witness the experi-
ence of the State of New York with a similar standard since early
in this century.4 '
What kinds of guns should be banned? The old New York stat-
ute forbade concealed weapons 42 -apparently meaning pistols
and sawed-off shotguns, but not hunting rifles. Gun control oppo-
nents may be worried about a "foot in the door," and the NRA
probably includes in its membership not only hunters but also
those who use pistols for target practice or as collectors' items.
Further, there are some who believe that possession of a handgun
37 There were provisions in the Twenty-first Amendment, which repealed prohibition,
that were intended to preserve local option as to the regulation of alcoholic beverages.
Although a persuasive case might otherwise have been made that Congressional regulation
of the drinking age could be sustained under the Commerce Clause (because, inter alia, of
the effect of drunken driving on the use of interstate highways), it is possible that this
power might have been defeated by an expansionist construction of the extent of local con-
trol preserved.
38 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09.
39 For a fuller discussion of these questions, see Fox & Shah, supra note 2, at passim.
40 See Cunningham, supra note 2, at 61-64; Murtha & Smith, supra note 1, at 216. But
see Brady, supra note 2, at 80-81 (1994) (setting forth statistics on accomplishments of
Brady law).
41 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1897, 1898 (Consol. 1909); see also People ex. rel. Darling v. War-
den, 154 A.D. 413, 139 N.Y.S. 277 (1st Dep't 1913); People v. Grass, 79 Misc. 457, 141
N.Y.S. 204 (Nassau County Ct. 1913).
42 N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 1897, 1898 (Consol. 1909).
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increases the safety of the possessors and those close to them
rather than jeopardizing it, and it has even been argued that if
more and more people had weapons, there would be less and less
criminal activity.43 As for assault weapons, there may be problems
of definition, but the inappropriateness of their use by sportsmen,
as distinguished from gangsters or maniacs, must be embarrass-
ing to lobbyists who are trying to obtain the repeal of the assault
weapon ban in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994.4
The failure of almost a century of gun control laws in New York
and in some other states has sometimes been ascribed to the ease
of movement of guns across state lines.45 Federal laws criminaliz-
ing such interstate commerce have not seemed to be of much help.
Nationwide restrictions on possession might prove to be more ef-
fective, but there is not much reason for confidence that they
would provide anything approaching a complete solution.
Which brings us back to where we came in. Senator Bill Brad-
ley points out the array of interrelated factors that contribute to
the high level of violence in today's society, and suggests a pro-
gram to start to deal with them. 46 This approach, of which denial
of access to guns is one of a number of components, seems to offer
more hope than gun control alone. Two of the student notes also
emphasize the need to learn more about the causes of violence and
the ways to cope with it.
Wayne Wink 47 analyzes and expands on some proposals of Sen-
ator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, including concentrating less on
guns and more on ammunition (especially recently developed,
more destructive types of ammunition), and imposing prohibitive
taxes on the production of at least some kinds of guns and ammu-
nition. Mr. Wink also discusses changing products liability law to
impose financial responsibility upon the manufacturers for gun-
caused injury or death .
Lynn Murtha and Suzanne Smith emphasize the need to under-
stand and seek to ameliorate the factors that give rise to violence,
43 E.g., Cunningham, supra note 2, at 63; Daniel Polsby, The False Promise of Gun Con-
trol, ATLANTc MONTLY, March 1994, at 62. But cf Fox & Shah, supra note 2, at 131.
44 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
45 See Fox & Shah, supra note 2, at 136-37; Wink, supra note 12, at 235-36.
46 See Bradley, supra note 1, at 47-54; see also Murtha & Smith, supra note 1, at 230-33.
47 See Wink, supra note 12, at 236-41.
48 See id. at 251-60; see also Brady, supra note 2, at 84.
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and the relatively minor attention accorded them by the govern-
ment. In particular, they point out that although Congress has
provided some funding for further investigation of the causes of
and possible remedies for gun-inflicted violence, the amount of
money authorized for these purposes is dwarfed by that to be
spent for apprehension and punishment.49
The extent of our ignorance about the causes and cures for this
unprecedented crisis in our society is deplorable. Furthermore,
history suggests that the building of more and more prisons and
the broadening application of the death penalty will probably ac-
complish little for our protection and less for our enlightenment.
The Articles and Notes in this Symposium attack these
problems from a variety of starting points and offer a wide range
of insights. Let us hope that they will prove to be a significant
step toward a better understanding of the existing problems, and
ultimately toward the development of successful solutions for the
future.
49 See Murtha & Smith, supra note 1, at 225-33.
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